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AIRPORT EXPANSION-COSTS VS. ENVIRONMENTAL
DAMAGE WHEN EXPANDING AIRPORT FACILITIES-
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT ALL
REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS NEED
NOT BE EXPLAINED IN GREAT DETAIL IN THE FAA'S
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT-
CITY OF BRIDGETON V. FAA
SHELBY ANGEL*
T HE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL Policy Act (NEPA)1
mandates that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
prepare a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) if pro-
posing any action that will have a major affect on the human
environment. In the recent case of City of Bridgeton v. FAA,2 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided
that a three-tiered analysis3 of alternatives in an airport expan-
sion proposal was sufficient and that no further detail was
needed in the FEIS in comparing alternatives not "adopted.4 In
declining to require certain detail regarding considered alterna-
tives, the court created a situation in which it is difficult to ascer-
tain whether the governmental entity fairly dismissed reasonable
alternatives which would have minimal affects on the environ-
ment while still reaching the main goals of the proposed
project.
* B.A., 2000, San Diego State University; J.D. Candidate, May 2003, Southern
Methodist University, Dedman School of Law. The author wishes to thank her
parents, Dr. Dan and Pat Angel, and her husband, Santiago Giraldo, for their
support, encouragement, and patience.
42 U.S.C.S. § 4231 et seq. (2002).
2 City of Bridgeton v. FAA, 212 F.3d 448 (8th Cir. 2000).
s The three-tiered analysis followed this approach: In Tier 1, the alternative
had to fulfill basic operational goals of the proposed federal action. Those that
passed went on to Tier 2, where they underwent a cost/benefit analysis. Tier 3
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Lambert Airport ("Lambert") lies just outside of St. Louis,
Missouri. As one of the busiest airports in the nation, Lambert
has experienced significant delays in the past years due to the
structural layout of its runways.5 The airport depends solely on
two parallel runways that are less than 1,300 feet apart.6 Due to
the small separation, it is too dangerous to allow two planes to
land simultaneously in bad weather.7
The FAA and local planners have consistently been con-
cerned about reducing delays at Lambert Airport. In 1983 and
1993, St. Louis supported a study to explore ways in which the
airport could be expanded.8 After rejecting a first plan because
the costs were too extensive and because it would interfere with
the current operation of the airport hub, St. Louis selected a
plan called Alternative W-1W,9 which would have negative ef-
fects on the city of Bridgeton, and to a lesser degree on the city
of St. Charles and St. Charles County.' °
The FAA studied the proposal for more than two years, dur-
ing which it scrutinized many options and alternatives.I In De-
cember 1997 the FAA issued a FEIS, and in September 1998, it
issued a Record of Decision, which approved the W-1W
project. 12
Bridgeton petitioned for review of the FAA decision approv-
ing the W-1W proposal.' 3 Petitioners claimed that the decision
5 Id. at 453.
6 In order to land planes simultaneously in incremental weather, the FAA re-
quires that parallel runways be at least 4,300 feet apart, or 3,400 feet if the airport
has a precision runway monitory. Id. at 453 n.l.
7 Id. at 448.
8 Id.
" W-1W calls for constructing a new runway, west of and parallel to the existing
runways, of 9,200 feet.
10 The negative effects include the following: 1) the relocation of 5,685 people,
mostly in the city of Bridgeton; 2) the relocation of 75 businesses 3) direct affects
on 26 acres of parkland. Id. at 454. It is worth noting here, that alternative S-i
was also considered, but ultimately decided against. Although alternative S-1
would have better reached operational goals, the environmental impact was too
great (9,275 people would be displaced, 210 businesses would be relocated, and
57 acres of parkland would be affected). Id. However, it is also important to note
that Ne-la, not explained in detail in the FEIS, would not have displace any peo-
ple or affected almost any people due to the project. Id. at 465.
1 Specifically, the FAA examined eight project alternatives (N-i, NE-1, NE-la,
W-iW, W-iE, W-2, S-i, and C-i), a no-action alternative, and off-site expansion
alternatives. Only the S-i, W-IW and the no-action alternative were considered in
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that alternatives must only be "briefly" discussed violated federal
statutes, specifically NEPA,14 §4(f) of the Transportation Act
(TA),5 and the consistency and notice provisions of the Airport
Airway and Improvement Act (AAIA). 16 The court denied the
petitions for review and also denied Bridgeton's motion to file a
supplemental brief. 1 7
Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Loken measured the
sufficiency of explanations laid out by the FAA in the FEIS.18
Applying language from both the NEPA and TA statutes, he ad-
dressed the requirement to only "briefly discuss"19 unreasonable
alternatives not considered in the project. 20 Therefore, the
court had to determine whether the FAA had properly excluded
detailed explanations of unreasonable alternatives, such as NE-
la in the FEIS. 21
According to the court of appeals, the FAA included all rea-
sonable alternatives in its detailed analysis under NEPA, while
properly excluding Alternative NE-la, among other options.22
The court concluded that the FAA correctly left out detailed
analysis of the alternatives because they did not meet the "pur-
pose and need" of the proposal.23 In addition, the court deemed
the need for arrival of planes simultaneously in bad weather as a
"significant purpose" of the project. 24 In doing so, the court em-
14 42 U.S.C. § 4231 et seq. (2002).
15 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2002).
16 49 U.S.C. § 47106(a)(1) (2002); 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1) (2002).
17 City of Bridgeton, 212 F.3d at 463.
18 Id.
19 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2002).
20 City of Bridgeton, 212 F.3d at 455.
21 See id.
22 Id.
23 The purposes and needs of the project were to:
"effectively and safely accommodate project levels of aviation activ-
ity at an acceptable level of delay" by increased airfield capacity,
improving visual flight rules capacity, allowing dual independent
simultaneous arrivals in bad weather conditions, and decreasing de-
lays; 2) to enhance the National Airspace System [(NAS)] by in-
creasing capacity and reducing delays; [and] 3) to maintain Lambert's
importance to the economic vitality of the St. Louis region.
City of Bridgeton, 212 F.3d at 454 (emphasis added). As the FAA itself notes, simul-
taneous arrivals are only "one of many indicia of a capacity-building alternative."
See id. at 465 (quoting FAA Brief at 62). The dissent highlights that "[t]he FAA
itself states that NE-la does meet the project's goals with respect to the [NAS]
and... the hubbing and economic goals of the region." Id. at 465 (Arnold, J.,
dissenting).
24 Id. at 457.
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phasized the FAA's extensive comments and analysis about the
economic and environmental effects of the options chosen for
detailed analysis.2 1
Judge Arnold dissented. He argued that while he fully agreed
with the "expert" judgment of the FAA, the agency had never-
theless "violated NEPA by excluding from detailed considera-
tion certain alternatives to its preferred solution.126  He
concluded that the district court erred in approving the FEIS
because the FAA had not sufficiently flushed out alternatives in
the report. Instead, Judge Arnold argued, the FAA merely dis-
carded such alternatives and focused on only the two options
most beneficial to them on a cost basis, rather than considering
and comparing reasonable alternatives which were feasible and
had a friendlier environmental impact.27
The court is correct in its conclusion that the W-1W was feasi-
ble and that the FAA's decision to implement it was not "arbi-
trary or capricious." However, the court is incorrect in finding
the FAA followed NEPA procedurally by discussing other plausi-
ble alternatives in sufficient detail in the FEIS.2s The court de-
clares that the FAA was correct in omitting Alternative Ne-la 29
from its second tier analysis because the alternative was not seri-
ously considered. 3 This finding goes against the language of
NEPA policies and goals. The NEPA statute dictates that "to the
fullest extent possible," "detailed statements" must be included
in every report including such statements about the "alternatives
to the proposed action. '"' Requiring detail on plausible alterna-
25 City of Bridgeton, 212 F.3d at 462.
26 The dissent is referring specifically to Alternative Ne-la, which was consid-
ered by the FAA but not included in detail in the FEIS. See id. at 464-65.
27 See id. at 464-66 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
28 The majority argues that NEPA does not mandate a particular outcome. See id.
The author fully agrees with this statement, but argues that NEPA does mandate
certain procedures, such as the discussion of all reasonable alternatives in sufficient
detail in the FEIS. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2002).
29 Alternative Ne-la failed under the FAA's analysis in Tier 1 because the FAA
claimed that it did not meet the "basic operational goals" of the plan. See City of
Bridgeton, 212 F.3d at 457. The author argues that the court's reasoning is mis-
placed here in allowing the specifics of Ne-la to be left behind after the first tier,
because in order to meet the "basic operational goals" it is not necessary that
every single goal be met to the exact standards proposed. See North Buckhead
Civic Assoc. v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 1542-43 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Surfrider
Foundation v. Dalton, 989 F. Supp. 1309, 1326 (S.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd per curiam,
196 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1999).
30 City of Bridgeton, 212 F.3d at 448.
-' See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (2001).
1012
CITY OF BRIDGETON V. FAA
tives does not ask for the FAA to "include every alternative de-
vice thought conceivable by the mind of man. 32 Such a gross
exaggeration is not required. Instead, the language of the stat-
ute supports giving details for plausible alternatives considered.
This is not as great a burden as majority suggests. 3
The court is also flawed in its conclusion that Alternative NE-
la was correctly omitted from detailed discussion because it did
not meet the "purpose and need" of the proposal and was thus
unreasonable.3 4 The court considers only the standards and
goals given by the FAA in its analysis, 35 defining "purpose and
need" so narrowly that if the court's criteria were used, the FAA
could establish any goal when designing a project. If an alterna-
tive does not reach every aspect of the FAA's goals exactly, then
the alternative is considered unreasonable, and can be excluded
from detailed explanation. Notably, this allows the FAA to dis-
card "unreasonable" alternatives, regardless of the environmen-
tal impact relative to the alternative chosen. 6
In addition, the court incorrectly interprets a Seventh Circuit
case that gave credence to a regional commission's approval of a
proposal 7.3 In that case, the court merely asserted that the com-
mission's approval gave support to the project; nowhere in the
opinion did it declare that the commission's approval would
trump any opposing local authority's plans. In fact, in the case
cited by the majority, there were no opposing zoning laws in
direct conflict with the project.38 Here, the project proposed,
while approved by the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council
(EWGCC), is in direct conflict with Bridgeton's development
plan. Under Missouri law, the EWGCC is able to issue opinions
in support of proposals, but those opinions are "solely advi-
sory."3 9 Thus, the fact that the EWGCC supports the proposal
does not overcome the obstacle that the project conflicts with
32 See City of Bridgeton, 212 F.3d at 455.
33 See 40 C.F.R. 1502.14 (2002) ("[A]gencies shall: [r]igorously explore and
objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives" and "[dievote substantial treat-
ment to each alternative considered in detail including the proposed action... so
that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits.") (emphasis added).
34 City of Bridgeton 212 F.3d at 457.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 458, 461.
37 See id. at 466, dissenting opinion (applying concepts from Suburban O'Hare
Comm'n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186, 199 (7th Cir. 1986)).
38 See id.
39 See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 251.300, 251.350 (2002).
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the plans developed by the Bridgeton, an agency authorized by
the State to develop plans for the airport.41
As it stands, City of Bridgeton allows for the FAA to sidestep any
alternatives that are not necessarily beneficial to the Administra-
tion by focusing primarily on certain options without providing
detailed explanations on others that were plausible, though not
as appealing to the FAA on a cost or goal basis. By not requiring
detailed explanations about such feasible alternatives, the court
creates a situation in which it is impossible to analyze from the
report whether other alternatives would have been equally plau-
sible and more beneficial to the public while still reaching the
overall goals of the plan.41
40 See 49 U.S.C. § 47106 (a) (1) (2002) ("The Secretary of Transportation may
approve an application. . . only if the Secretary is satisfied that-the project is
consistent with plans ... authorized by the State in which the airport is located"
(emphasis added)).
41 See North Buckhead Civic Assoc. v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1553, 1542 (11th Cir.
1990) ("Alternatives that would only partly meet the goals of the project may
allow the decision maker to conclude that meeting part of the goal with less envi-
ronmental impact may be worth the trade of with a preferred alternative that has
greater environmental impact"); see also Surfrider Foundation v. Dalton, 989 F.
Supp. 1309, 1326 (S.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd per curiam, 196 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir.
1999) (supporting the conclusion that the mere fact that one solution is pre-
ferred by an agency in substantive terms doe not exclude the possibility that an-
other alternative is reasonable in other terms).
